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Abstract—Android-based devices like smartphones have 
become ideal mobile cyber-physical systems (MCPS) due to their 
powerful processors and variety of sensors. In recent years, an 
explosively and continuously growing number of malicious 
applications (malapps) have posed a great threat to 
Android-based MCPS as well as users’ privacy. The effective 
detection of malapps is an emerging yet crucial task. How to 
establish relationships among malapps, discover their potential 
communities, and explore their evolution process has become a 
challenging issue in effective detection of malapps. To deal with 
this issue, in this work, we are motivated to propose an automated 
community detection method for Android malapps by building a 
relation graph based on their static features. First, we construct a 
large feature set to profile the behaviors of malapps. Second, we 
propose an E-N algorithm by combining epsilon graph and 
k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) graph for graph construction. It solves 
the problem of an incomplete graph led by epsilon method and the 
problem of noise generated by k-NN graph. Finally, a community 
detection method, Infomap, is employed to explore the underlying 
structures of the relation graph, and obtain the communities of 
malapps. We evaluate our community detection method with 3996 
malapp samples. Extensive experimental results show that our 
method outperforms the traditional clustering methods and 
achieves the best performance with rand statistic of 94.93% and 
accuracy of 79.53%. 
Index Terms—Mobile cyber-physical system, Android, malapp 
classification, community discovery.                   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The popularity of mobile devices has increased great interest 
in the area of mobile cyber-physical systems (MCPS). 
Smartphones have become ideal MCPS due to their powerful 
processors and variety of sensors. Android has been the most 
popular mobile operating system for smartphones with a global 
market share of 87.6% [1]. However, the open nature of 
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Android system and the readily-available application 
distribution mechanism attract both developers and attackers. 
Malapps are developed to steal personal information or gain 
control of devices illegally. More severely, the attack can easily 
expend from the users’ cyber world to physical world, which 
will pose a great threat to users’ privacy and properties. 
Symantec [2] indicated that the volume of new Android malapp 
variants was up to 3.6 thousand. They blocked 18.4 million 
mobile malapp infections in 2016. The significant growth of 
malapps targeting Android-based MCPS increasingly requires 
efficient methods that can automatically profile and categorize 
malapps. 
In order to cut costs and accelerate the development process, 
attackers tend to inject malicious components into an existing 
malapp and publish it after reassembling. Since code reuse is 
widely adopted in malapp programming, though large amount 
of malapps arise every day, most of them are variants of 
existing malapp families [3]. Samples in the same family share 
similar behaviors and show similar vulnerabilities. Malapp 
family classification can filter out existing malapp variants 
quickly and leave the others for further analysis. Hence it can 
expedite malapp detection process. In addition, exploring the 
relations among malapps and studying the evolution process of 
families can help to get a better understanding of malapp 
development, and further forecast the developing trend. 
Therefore, categorizing malapps is very helpful for maintaining 
the security of Android ecosystem.  
Although there exists work focusing on characterizing 
malapp families, some problems remain unsolved. First, the 
boundaries of malapp families are difficult to define. Some 
behaviors are common among malapps, such as connecting the 
Internet or sending phone identifiers to remote servers. These 
similar behaviors will result in the similarity of different 
families and the obscurity of their boundaries. How to precisely 
characterize malapps and find the families’ patterns remain 
unaddressed. Second, most existing work on categorizing 
malapp families is based on supervised machine-learning 
classification methods. The high precision achieved by some 
methods depend on the large labelled dataset in the training 
process.  The requirement of labelled data, however, limits the 
ability to detect new malapp families. On the other hand, for the 
traditional unsupervised clustering methods, e.g., k-means, the 
evaluation of similarities among malapps in which is too coarse 
to capture the implicit information and the underlying relations 
of malapps.   
As new malapps appear very frequently, alternative methods 
that are able to discover novel malapp families have become a 
necessity rather than an option. In this work, we treat malapps 
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 in a correlation perspective. The relationship between malapps 
and their associated families is like individuals and 
organizations. Since individuals in the same organization are 
related to each other by various interdependencies, the more 
similar the samples’ behaviors are, the more likely they are in 
the same organization. Community detection techniques can be 
leveraged to discover relations between interacting individuals. 
For example, in a social network, people in the same 
community share the same schools or hobbies. In a biological 
protein network, communities are functional modules of 
interacting proteins [4]. Similarly, in a malapp relation graph, 
malapps can be regarded as vertices and the relationships can 
be represented by weighted edges. Malapps that behave 
similarly would gather into the same community. The newly 
arising malapps will deviate from existing families and form 
their own groups. Thus both variants from known families and 
novel malapp families can be discovered. 
To deal with the security issue on Android-based MCPS, in 
this paper, we propose a framework for malapp classification 
based on the community concept. The main idea is to build a 
relation graph for malapps and apply community detection 
methods for community discovery. First, we disassemble the 
Android Package (APK) file of each malapp and extract 
information to characterize its behaviors. The features fall into 
11 categories, which profile each malapp in different aspects. 
Second, we calculate the weights between each pair of malapps 
based on the features. The weights represent similarities among 
malapps. Variants in the same family tend to have higher 
weights because of their similar behaviors. Third, we generate 
an undirected weighted graph for all the malapps based on the 
weights. We name this graph relation graph since it represents 
the relations among malapps. Finally, we employ Infomap, a 
community detection algorithm, to extract the 
highly-inner-connected communities in the graph. Community 
detection methods are able to better explore the implicit 
similarities of interrelated data than traditional clustering 
methods. Our approach does not need to know any prior 
patterns of malapps. It is able to classify not only variants of 
existing malapp families, but also newly arising families. 
We make the following contributions: 
(1) We construct a large feature set that contains 11 
categories to characterize the behaviors of malapps on 
Android-based MCPS. According to the generality, the features 
of 11 categories are divided into two types, app-specific and 
platform-defined. We evaluate different feature sets in terms of 
their effectiveness and limitations on the detection of malapps. 
(2) We propose a graph construction algorithm named E-N 
method. The commonly used graphs, epsilon graph and k-NN 
graph suffer from isolated vertices and over-balanced 
problems, which could result in an incomplete graph and much 
noise during the process of graph construction. We combine the 
two graphs together to overcome these disadvantages. The 
empirical results show that the E-N method achieves better 
efficiency and accuracy. 
 (3) We apply community detection techniques to group 
malapps and uncover their underlying relations. Community 
detection methods are rarely applied in the area of exploring the 
relations of Android malapps. They can explore underlying 
relations of malapps and show better adaptability to noise and 
outliers than traditional clustering methods. We provide 
detailed explanations about their superiority in malapp 
detection. 
 (4) We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate our 
community detection method based on E-N algorithm. The 
experimental results demonstrate that our method outperforms 
the traditional clustering methods and achieves the best 
performance with rand statistic of 94.93% and accuracy of 
79.53%. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces related work on Android malapp detection and 
family classification. Section III describes the proposed 
method.  Section IV describes the experiments and discussion. 
The conclusion follows in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several approaches addressing the security issue of 
Android-based MCPS have been presented in the literature. For 
detecting and classifying malapps, static analysis and dynamic 
analysis are normally applied for malapp detection. 
Static features are extracted from decompiled APK files. Arp 
et al. [6] presented a system called DREBIN, which extracted 
static features such as component names, permissions, intents, 
API, etc. They considered linear SVM for the training task, and 
the comprehensive feature set at that time inspired later 
researchers. Shabtai et al. [7] extracted features from Android 
app files, such as Java bytecode and XML files. They tested 
several feature selection approaches to find the most 
representative sets of features. McLaughlin et al. [8] used a 
deep convolutional neural network to learn n-gram features of 
malapps’ opcode sequence. Andow et al. [9] proposed an 
automated approach for resolving the semantics of user inputs 
requested by mobile applications. They identified some 
concerning practices, such as insecure exposure of account 
passwords and achieved an overall accuracy of 95% at 
semantics resolution. In our previous work [10], we ranked the 
permissions according to their risks and systematically studied 
how well permissions perform in the detection of malapps. We 
built a framework [11] to effectively manage a big app market 
in terms of detecting malapps and categorizing benign apps. 
We also developed a static analysis tool called SDFDroid [12] 
that identified the sensors’ types and generated the sensor data 
propagation paths in each app to provide an overview of sensor 
usage patterns. To detect novel malapps, we developed an 
anomaly detection system called Anomadroid [13] to profile 
normal behaviors of normal apps. Apps whose behaviors 
deviated from the normal profile were identified as malicious. 
In general, dynamic analysis executes an app in the emulator 
and monitors its behaviors in the runtime. Enck et al. [14] 
proposed TaintDroid to figure out how apps collected and 
shared private data with dynamic taint analysis. It tracked 
multiple sources of sensitive data and monitored their sinks. 
Zhao et al. [15] introduced AMDetector which employed a 
hybrid static-dynamic analysis method to build an attack tree. 
The result showed that the True Positive Rate is 88.14%. A 
 number of researchers paid attention to network flows. Malapps 
need to connect remote severs to receive commands and send 
sensitive user data. Http header and statistic information (e.g., 
number of received packages) [16-21] were collected to profile 
malapps’ network behaviors. 
Classifying malapps into families can quickly filter out 
existing malapp variants from massive newly generated 
malapps and expedite detection process. Suarez-Tangil et al. 
[22] proposed DENDROID. They adopted the standard Vector 
Space Model to describe control flow structures and applied 
k-NN to classify malapp families. Dash et al. [23] developed 
DroidScribe to focus on app’s runtime behaviors such as 
network access, file access, binder methods, etc. They proposed 
a prediction technique to improve SVM performance. Hsiao et 
al. [24] extracted API call sequences and applied phylogenetic 
tree, PCA and dot matrix to demonstrate malapps’ behavioral 
correlations. Since most of the malapps are repackaged, 
detection algorithms based on graph similarity are widely 
adopted. Zhou et al. [25] built sensitive API call graphs and 
compared their maximum isomorphic subgraphs to classify 
malapp families. Hu et al. [26] proposed MIGDroid to construct 
method invocation graphs on the Smali code level, and then 
divided the method invocation graphs into weakly connected 
sub-graphs. It calculated threat scores based on sensitive APIs. 
Subgraphs with higher scores were more likely to be malicious. 
Crussell et al. [27] proposed DNADroid to detect clone apps by 
comparing program dependency graphs between methods in 
candidate applications. Zhang et al. [28] proposed ViewDroid 
and created a feature view graph based on users' navigation 
behaviors across app views. It characterized Android apps from 
a higher-level abstraction, making it resilient to code 
obfuscation. Key management ([29-31]) is essential for 
security. Several papers (e.g., [32-35]) have studied related 
security issues. 
Although there exists work focused on malapp family 
classification, however, some problems remain unsolved. 
Graph similarity based methods suffer from high computational 
complexity. In addition, most supervised methods can only 
classify malapps with known labels and cannot handle new 
malapp families. Moreover, the traditional unsupervised 
methods are unable to demarcate families because of the coarse 
evaluation method. Therefore, to deal with novel malapps and 
uncover their relations, we apply community detection 
techniques to explore communities of malapps. 
III. METHOD 
The framework of our method consists of four phases: 
feature extraction, data preparation, relation graph construction 
and community detection. As described in Fig. 1, after the 
malapps are fed into the framework, a large number of features 
will be extracted from each APK file. We utilize tf-idf to 
measure the importance of features. Then we calculate the 
weights between each pair of malapps based on the features. In 
the graph construction phase, we propose the E-N algorithm to 
build a relation graph for malapps based on the weights. 
Finally, a community detection algorithm is applied to discover 
the underlying structures of the graph. 
A. Feature Extraction 
Representative and comprehensive features are in great 
demand to profile malapps’ behaviors. Since dynamic analysis 
is highly consumptive of system resources, and how to traverse 
all paths to trigger more behaviors is another difficulty 
remaining unsolved. In this work, we employ static analysis, so 
as to reach the goal of being efficient. We extract 11 categories 
of features from AndroidManifest.xml and Dex files. The large 
feature set can characterize an app in different aspects. The 
summary of features can be seen in Table I. 
TABLE I FEATURE SET 
 
These static features are divided into two types according to 
their generality and specificity: platform-defined and 
app-specific. Platform-defined features are defined by Android 
system and can be applied to all apps. App-specific features are 
defined by developers and are sometimes unique to certain 
apps. In section IV, we make a comparison between the feature 
sets and discuss their advantages as well as limitations. 
The values of features have two types: some features are 
Boolean, e.g., whether the permission is declared. Others are 
numeric, e.g., the frequency of a certain API is invoked. We use 
numeric features instead of binary features because they 
contain more information. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of 
tf-idf relies on the computation of frequencies. 
B. Data Preparation 
High dimensional feature vectors are required for further 
 Feature Name Data Type Feature Type 
FS1 Requested 
permissions 
Boolean Platform-defined/App-specific 
FS2 Filtered intents Numeric Platform-defined/App-specific 
FS3 Restricted API Numeric Platform-defined 
FS4 Components 
names 
Boolean App-specific 
FS5 Code patterns Boolean Platform-defined 
FS6 Certification 
information 
Boolean App-specific 
FS7 Payload file types Numeric Platform-defined 
FS8 Strings  Numeric App-specific 
FS9 Used permissions Boolean Platform-defined 
FS10 Hardware Boolean Platform-defined 
FS11 Suspicious calls Numeric Platform-defined 
Fig. 1. Framework of our method 
 analysis. A feature vector, which represents a malapp, is 
defined as 𝐹𝐹 = (𝑓𝑓1, 𝑓𝑓2, …𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛), where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of features 
and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  is the value of 𝑖𝑖-th feature. If the malapp does not have 
the 𝑖𝑖-th feature, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  would be set to 0. 
Term frequency-inverse document frequency (Tf-idf) [36] is 
a numerical statistic method that measures the importance of a 
word to the whole text. We employ tf-idf to measure the 
representativeness of features. It can be defined in logarithmic 
form as 
                         𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 × 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚�                         (1) 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  is the frequency of feature 𝑚𝑚 in sample 𝑗𝑗, 𝑛𝑛 is the 
size of dataset, 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 is the total number of samples that contain 
feature 𝑚𝑚 in the dataset. If 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  is high, it means feature 𝑚𝑚 
appears frequently in sample 𝑗𝑗 , but rarely appears in other 
samples, which makes feature 𝑚𝑚  highly representative of 
sample 𝑗𝑗. 
To quantify the closeness among malapps, we calculate the 
weights for each malapp pair 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, which is defined  as 
   𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓(𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘                                  (2) 
where  𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘  is the common feature between 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The weight 
indicates both the quantity and importance of common features 
between malapps. In general, if malapp pair 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 share a high 
weight, they hold high potential to be similar.  
C. Relation Graph Construction 
The relation graph construction phase is essential to 
community detection. A well-defined graph reveals relations 
among malapps, not only by the directly connected vertices, but 
also by their neighbors. After phases of feature extraction and 
data preparation, we get feature vectors that profile malapps’ 
behaviors and weights of malapp pairs which indicate their 
similarities. Based on these weights, we build a co-occurrence 
relation graph for all malapps in the dataset. Two samples are 
more likely to establish a connection if specific features appear 
in both of them. The relation graph is an undirected weighted 
graph, which is defined as 𝐺𝐺 = (𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸,𝑊𝑊). 𝑉𝑉 is the vertex set 
and each 𝑣𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑉 represents a malapp. 𝐸𝐸 is the edge set. There is 
an edge between two vertices if two malapps share a high 
weight. 𝑊𝑊 is the weight set of the edges and the 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚  in 𝑊𝑊 is 
defined in (2). The most commonly used graphs are the 
k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) graph and the epsilon graph. 
The k-nearest neighbor graph is a graph in which two 
vertices, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉 and  𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑉𝑉, are connected by an edge, if the 
weight between 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 is among the 𝑘𝑘 largest weights of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖. 
In order to find the k-nearest neighbors, weights between 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
and any  𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑉𝑉 need to be sorted. The sorting process could be 
a bottleneck, since the time complexity is too high if the vertex 
set is large. Furthermore, k-NN over balanced the number of 
nearest neighbors. If a vertex has high similarities with a 
quantity of vertices, it would lose lots of similar neighbors by 
connecting only 𝑘𝑘  of them. On the other hand, a marginal 
vertex that has low similarity with others would be forced to 
link to 𝑘𝑘 vertices, which would increase the noise in the relation 
graph. It further leads to the difficulty of the selection of 𝑘𝑘 
since 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛], where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of vertices. The time 
complexity and the over balanced problem have become its 
main drawbacks. 
In an epsilon graph, an edge will be created between every 
vertex pair 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  if  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 > 𝜀𝜀 . Compared with k-NN, the 
construction process is more efficient. Since 𝜀𝜀 is a constant and 
global measurement for all malapps, the degrees of vertices are 
entirely based on their closeness with others, instead of being 
set manually. However, the parameter 𝜀𝜀 cannot characterize the 
relations between vertices universally. If 𝜀𝜀 is small, numerous 
vertices that are not so similar with each other will be 
connected, and a dense complete graph is formed with fuzzy 
community structures. Thus we cannot achieve a clear 
observation of the communities’ distribution. If we pick a 
large 𝜀𝜀, only the most similar vertices would be joint together. 
But in the meantime, the number of isolated vertices will 
increase, which would lead to incompleteness of the graph, and 
further limit community detection progress. 
 
(a) K-NN graph with k=2                     (b) Epsilon graph 
Fig. 2. An example of k-NN graph and epsilon graph 
Since the k-NN graph and the epsilon graph both have 
disadvantages, to achieve the goal of fast constructing a distinct 
and representative relation graph of malapps, we propose the 
E-N method by combining the two graphs together. The graph 
construction process consists of two steps: Firstly, an edge 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 
is created if 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚is among the top 𝑝𝑝 percent of  𝑊𝑊, where 𝑝𝑝 is 
defined as 𝑝𝑝 = |�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗≥𝜖𝜖�||𝑊𝑊| × 100 . Based on our experimental 
results, when 𝑝𝑝 is around 10, the edges can best demonstrate 
relations between vertices. Secondly, for the few isolated 
vertices, k-NN is applied to give connections to their 𝑘𝑘 nearest 
neighbors. In this case, the disadvantages of over balance and 
high time complexity in k-NN graph are made up by epsilon 
graph, and in the meantime, the problem of isolated vertices in 
epsilon graph is addressed by k-NN. The E-N algorithm 
achieves complementarity of epsilon method and k-NN 
method. It is described below. 
 
Algorithm 1: E-N Method 
Input: 𝑉𝑉,𝑊𝑊 
1. for each 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  
2.     if 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 > 𝜀𝜀 
3.         create edge 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 
4. end for 
5. for each 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 that has no edge 
6.     find its k-nearest neighbors 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚) 
7.     for each 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚) 
8.         create edge 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 
9.     end for 
Output:  𝐸𝐸 
D. Community Detection 
Various malapp families can form inner-dense communities 
 [37] within the relation graph. Infomap [38] is employed to 
extract the underlying structures of the graph. We assume that 
there is a flow of information on the graph moving along the 
links between graph entities. The graph structure represented 
by links will influence and control the directions of the flow. If 
we assign each vertex a unique code, the steps of the flow trace 
with a series of encoding can be described. Next, we apply a 
flow-based and information-theoretic method, which is known 
as a map equation, to quantify how well the structures drive this 
flow across the graph. For the malapp relation graph, the map 
equation specifies the theoretical limit of how concisely we can 
describe the trajectory of the flow on the graph. Minimizing the 
map equation over all possible graph partitions reveals which 
structure can most probably lead to such a flow trajectory. Thus 
the problem of detecting underlying structures can be 
transformed into a coding compression problem: how to 
compress the code for describing locations of the flow trace.  
The malapp relation graph can be decomposed into a set of 
communities. Once the flow enters a community, it tends to 
remain flowing in the community for a long time because 
intra-community vertices are more densely connected than 
inter-community vertices. A codeword is a sequence of binary 
code assigned to a vertex. A set of codewords compose a 
codebook, which is used to describe vertices in a community. 
By implementing separate codebooks for different 
communities, the average code length will be shorter than a 
global Huffman code. According to Shannon’s source coding 
theorem [38], which implies that when we use 𝑛𝑛 codewords to 
describe the 𝑛𝑛 states of a random variable 𝑋𝑋 that occur with 
frequencies 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , the average length of codewords can be no less 
than the entropy of the random variable 𝑋𝑋  itself:               
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) = −∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛1 . If we partition the graph with 𝑛𝑛 
vertices into 𝑚𝑚 communities, the lower limit of code length can 
be defined as 
𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀) = 𝑞𝑞↷𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄) + ∑ 𝑝𝑝↻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1                       (3) 
Here 𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄)  is the entropy of the index codebook. Index 
codebook is used to switch between communities. 𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) is the 
entropy of codebook 𝑖𝑖. 𝑞𝑞↷ is the probability that the flow exits 
communities and 𝑝𝑝↻𝑖𝑖  is the probability the flow stays in 
community  𝑖𝑖  and exits the community. The algorithm of 
Infomap is described below. 
Algorithm 2: Infomap  
Input: 𝐸𝐸,𝑊𝑊 
1. assign each 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 with community 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 
2. compute map equation e𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
3.     for each 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 randomly 
4.         for each 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) 
5.             Assume 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is assigned with community 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 
compute map equation e𝑚𝑚 and difference ∆e = e𝑚𝑚 − e𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
6.         end for 
7.         if  min∆e ≥ 0 
8.             do nothing 
9.         else  
10.             assign 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 with community 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 , 𝑗𝑗 = min
j
∆e 
11.      end for 
12. repeat step 2-11 until all vertices’ map equation do not decrease 
13. rebuild the graph, with the last-level communities forming the 
vertices at this level 
14. repeat step 2-13 until the map equation no longer decreases 
Output: 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 
E. Measurement 
We apply two measurements to evaluate our community 
detection method, Rand Statistic (RS) and Accuracy (Acc). 
Define 𝑃𝑃 = {𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝2, … 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛} as vertices’ original families, and 
𝐶𝐶 = {𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2, … 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚}as their newly discovered communities in the 
graph. 
(1) Rand Statistic (RS) 
We measure the partition of the communities by comparing 
the relations of each vertex pair �𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 , 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚� in 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐶𝐶. We use 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
to denote the case that 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 are in the same 𝑃𝑃 and also in 
the same 𝐶𝐶. 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 denotes the quantity of  vertex pairs that satisfy 
the condition of 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠. Similarly, the meaning of 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 can be 
seen in Table II. Apparently, 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 . 
The definition of Rand Statistic is 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑+𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠+𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
                               (4) 
The larger RS is, the more coincident 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐶𝐶 are. 
TABLE II NOTATION 
General notation Meaning 
𝑃𝑃 = {𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2, … 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛}  Original families 
𝐶𝐶 = {𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2, … 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚} Discovered communities 
ss 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  are in same P and C 
sd 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  are in same P but different C 
ds 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  are in different P but same C 
dd 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  are in different P and C 
(2) Accuracy (Acc) 
Accuracy is the fraction of correctly classified data points in 
the total dataset. In this case, we use maximum matching to find 
out the correspondence between 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐶𝐶. 
Given a vertex 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is the class label of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 assigned by an 
algorithm and 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is its true label. The Accuracy is defined as Accuracy = 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝛿𝛿(𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝(𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖))𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1                      (5) 
where 𝛿𝛿(∙) is a Kronecker function which returns 1 if the two 
variables are equal and 0 otherwise. 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝(⋅) is a mapping 
function that maps the label 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  to its corresponding maximum 
matching label 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 in the ground truth, 𝑛𝑛 is the total number of 
data point in the dataset. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to 
evaluate the features and our community detection method 
based on E-N algorithm. In subsection A, we make a 
comparison of two feature sets in terms of accuracy and 
 efficiency in community detection. We discuss their advantages 
and limitations in detail. In subsection B, we compare E-N 
graph with epsilon graph and k-NN graph in terms of 
community detection performance and time complexity. To 
demonstrate the superiority of our community-based 
classification method over traditional clustering method, we 
also take k-means into comparison. In subsection C, we give an 
intuitional results of the community detection performance and 
the underlying relations between malapp families.  
We collect 3996 malapp samples, which are from 13 popular 
malapp families, as our experiment dataset. The description of 
families can be seen in Table III. 
In the feature extraction phase, we decompile APK files and 
extract 29967 features, including 810 platform-defined features 
and 29157 app-specific features.  
The experiments are constructed on a PC with two quad-core 
3.4 GHz i7 processors and 16G memory. Our method is 
implemented in Python language. 
TABLE III MALAPP DATASET 
 Family  Size Brief Introduction 
1 Opfake 1004 Send premium SMS messages 
2 Plankton 868 Communicate with remote servers, 
download and install other applications, send 
premium SMS messages 
3 Youmi 329 An advertisement library that compromises  
personal information 
4 Utchi 305 An advertisement library that compromises 
personal information 
5 Basebridge 303 Forward confidential details (SMS, IMSI, 
IMEI) to a remote server 
6 Kmin 248 Send Android device data to a remote server 
7 Iconosys 153 Steal personal data 
8 Mseg 188 Steal private data and secretly send SMS to 
premium-rated numbers 
9 Fakedoc 147 Install additional applications 
10 Appquanta 140 Adware  
11 Geinimi 108 Open a back door and transmit information 
from the device (IMEI, IMSI, etc.) to a 
specific URL 
12 Gingerbreak 103 A root tool 
13 Smsspy 100 Banking Trojan targeting consumers in Spain 
Total  3996  
A. Feature Comparison 
The static features we extracted can be divided into 
platform-defined features and app-specific features. 
Platform-defined features are defined by Android system, e.g., 
the hardware and system APIs. App-specific features are 
generated by developers, e.g., strings such as IP or URL in the 
hard code. Since the app-specific feature set is much larger than 
platform-defined feature set, it is necessary to figure out 
whether the expense is worthwhile. 
We detect communities based on all features and only 
platform-defined features respectively. The detection 
performance is shown in Fig. 3. The y-axis represents the 
measurements of rand statistic or accuracy. The x-axis 
represents values of 𝑝𝑝. 𝑝𝑝 is a set by intervals, meaning that we 
create an edge for 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚  if 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚  is among the top 𝑝𝑝%  of 
weight set. E.g., when 𝑝𝑝 is 10, edges will be built for vertex 
pairs whose weights are among the top 10% of 𝑊𝑊. 
 
Fig. 3. Community detection performance based on two feature sets 
TABLE IV COMMUNITY DETECTION PERFORMANCE BASED ON TWO FEATURE 
SETS 
 
From Fig. 3 we have two observations.  
(1) Both feature sets’ performance shows a tendency of 
rise-steady-descend. If 𝑝𝑝 is set to a small value, which means 
that the corresponding 𝜀𝜀 is large, only the most similar vertex 
pairs have edges. The sparse edge set is unable to contain 
enough information to form communities, which leads to low 
detection accuracy. On the contrary, when 𝑝𝑝  is large, two 
vertices will be linked together even if they are not so similar. 
The numerous edges lead to obscure community boundaries. 
For instance, when 𝑝𝑝 is 20, the average degree of a vertex is 
400. When 𝑝𝑝  is 5, the degree drops to 101. When 𝑝𝑝  is set 
around 10, both feature sets achieve best performance.  
 (2) In general, the set of all features achieves better accuracy 
than platform-defined features. The set of all features contain 
both platform-defined features and app-specific features. It 
confirms the effectiveness of signatures on profiling malapps 
and distinguishing known families. As shown in Table IV, 
when 𝑝𝑝 is 9.5, the set of all features achieves best performance, 
with RS of 94.93% and accuracy of 79.53%. However, with 
only platform-defined features, we can achieve best accuracy of 
75.8%, only 4% lower than using all features, but reducing the 
size of feature set from 29157 to 810. It reveals that our 
approach is able to be independent of signatures or any prior 
patterns and has better practicability, which is a requirement to 
detect novel malapps. 
According to our previous work [5], though with 
app-specific features we can achieve better performance, 
platform-defined features are more persistent. In addition, in 
terms of quantity, the app-specific features grow with the 
increase of dataset, while the number of platform-defined 
features keeps stable instead. We rank the platform-defined 
features by their frequencies and obtain the top frequently used 
features. From Table V, we observe that 98.32% malapps ask 
for the Internet permission and 59.1% tend to send messages. 
71.42% malapps invoke “getDeviceId” API to get the unique 
identifier of the devices. 
 Platform-defined Features All Features 
p RS (%) Acc (%) RS(%) Acc(%) 
20 60.65 48.2 88.41 65.49 
9.5 90.06 70.47 94.93 79.53 
7.5 92.02 75.8 94.69 77.58 
4 22.65 25.9 27.5 28.85 
 TABLE V TOP 12 PLATFORM-DEFINED FEATURES IN ALL FAMILIES 
 Feature Name Percentage Feature Set 
1 Internet  98.32%  
 
 
Permission 
2 Read_Phone_State 97.52% 
3 Access_Network_State 84.64% 
4 Write_External_Storage 78.30% 
5 Receive_Boot_Completed 71.45% 
6 Send_Sms 59.10% 
7 Read_Sms 46.32% 
8 Reflection Used  82.76% Code Related 
9 Get System Service 71.42% Restricted 
API 10 Get Active Network Info 65.62% 
11 Telephony 64.59% Hardware 
12 Location 42.34%  
  
TABLE VI TOP 5 MOST COMMONLY INVOKED SENSITIVE APIS IN DIFFERENT 
FAMILIES 
Family Sensitive API 
Opfake Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId 
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getLine1Number 
Landroid/telephony/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage 
Landroid/telephony/gsm/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage 
Landroid/webkit/WebView;->loadUrl 
Fakedoc Landroid/app/ActivityManager;->restartPackage 
Landroid/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo 
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId 
Landroid/net/ConnectivityManager;->getNetworkInfo 
Landroid/net/wifi/WifiManager;->setWifiEnabled 
Ginger 
break 
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId 
Ljava/net/HttpURLConnection;->connect 
Landroid/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo 
Landroid/app/ActivityManager;->getRunningTasks 
Landroid/location/LocationManager;->getLastKnownLocation 
 
Malapps implement malicious operations by invoking 
sensitive APIs. APIs related to device information, network and 
location are most frequently used in malapps. Different families 
tend to have different rankings in APIs. We take Opfake, 
Fakedoc and Gingerbreak as an example. Table VI shows the 
top 5 sensitive API sets of these three families. Opfake’s 
malicious behavior is to send premium SMS messages. 
“SendTextMessage” is its 3rd commonly used sensitive API. 
Fakedoc aims to install additional applications. Thus 
establishing network connection and manipulating applications 
are its primary requirements. Gingerbreak is a tool to get the 
root permissions of the phones. It accesses devices’ information 
and users’ locations by “getDeviceId” and 
“getLastKnownLocation.” It monitors other applications by 
invoking “getRunningTasks” to get the activity which is being 
displayed. The same feature has different ranks in different 
families can ensure tf-idf achieves maximum effectiveness.  
B. Evaluation of E-N Method 
In this subsection, we employ the E-N method to construct 
the relation graph and test its performance on community 
detection. In order to facilitate comparisons with existing graph 
construction methods, we also conduct experiments on k-NN 
graph and epsilon graph. Moreover, to demonstrate the 
superiority of our community-based classification method over 
traditional clustering method, we took a comparison with the 
popularly used clustering algorithm, k-means [40]. 
As shown in Fig. 4, k-NN graph is sensitive to the parameter 
𝑘𝑘. When 𝑘𝑘 < 175, communities cannot be clearly found in the 
graph. When  𝑘𝑘 ∈ [180, 290] , it achieves the best detection 
accuracy of 74.97%.  
Epsilon graph and E-N graph show a tendency of 
rise-steady-descend. The reason has been discussed in 
subsection A. Picking the appropriate 𝑝𝑝 is much easier than 𝑘𝑘 
since 𝑘𝑘 is in a wide range of [1,𝑛𝑛]. Table VII and VIII show the 
detailed results. With platform-defined features, E-N graph 
achieves RS of 92.42% and accuracy of 77.73%. With all 
features, it has the best performance with RS of 94.93% and 
accuracy of 79.58%. In general, E-N graph achieves better 
performance than the other two graphs, which confirms the 
efficiency of the E-N method. 
Work exists [41-43] on categorizing malapps that applied the 
k-means  algorithm, however, the number of clusters need to be 
manually set. Given a set of malapps, it is difficult to tell the 
real number of their belonging families. In addition, k-means 
shows bad performance on data of which the hidden class is 
highly imbalanced. It is also very sensitive to outliers and noise. 
In our experiments, k-means fail to cluster the malapps. It only 
achieves the best accuracy of 41.99%. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Community detection performance based on k-NN graph, epsilon graph 
and E-N graph. The figure on the bottom shows the performance of k-means. 
TABLE VII PERFORMANCE OF MALAPP CLASSIFICATION BASED ON DIFFERENT 
METHODS WITH PLATFORM-DEFINED FEATURES 
Method Settings RS(%) Acc(%) 
Epsilon Graph p=8 92.12 75.61 
K-NN Graph k=235 92.68 74.97 
E-N Graph p=8, k=1 92.42 77.73 
K-means c=14 84.20 40.57 
TABLE VIII PERFORMANCE OF MALAPP CLASSIFICATION BASED ON DIFFERENT 
METHODS WITH ALL FEATURES 
Method Settings RS(%) Acc(%) 
Epsilon Graph p=11 94.93 79.53 
K-NN Graph k=235 92.68 74.97 
E-N Graph p=11, k=1 94.93 79.58 
K-means c=17 84.76 41.99 
 
To evaluate the E-N method in terms of time consumption, 
we compare the execution time of the three graph construction 
methods with different size of dataset, which is shown in Fig. 5. 
K-NN suffers from high time complexity. With the number of 
vertices increasing, its execution time rises rapidly. The epsilon 
graph achieves the best performance in terms of time 
complexity. In E-N algorithm, most vertices only need the first 
 step. The number of isolated vertices which are left to the k-NN 
phase is limited. Hence the execution time does not increase 
distinctly, compared to original epsilon method. When the 
number of vertices researches 1000, it only takes 35 seconds to 
build the relation graph with E-N method. For the whole 3996 
features, it only needs 10 minutes. 
 
Fig. 5. The execution time of graph construction based on three methods 
C. Performance of Community Detection 
In the graph construction step, we have built a relation graph 
based on our dateset. We can obscurely observe the relations 
among malapps in Fig. 6. Some malapps are densely connected, 
while some are dispersedly distributed. In order to extract the 
underlying relations in the graph, obtain distinct boundaries and 
detect communities, we apply Infomap. As shown in Fig. 7, the 
relation graph is divided into several dependent communities 
and the structures can be clearly observed. 
 Fig. 8 is a matrix describing the E-N graph based 
community detection results of different families. The y-axis 
represents 13 test malapp families and the x-axis represents 27 
communities found in the relation graph. The color block 
represents the percent of elements in 𝑥𝑥 family assigned to 𝑦𝑦 
community. The more malapps in the corresponding 
community, the brighter the color is. For Appquanta, 
Basebridge, Fakedoc, Geinimi, Iconosys, Mesg, Plankton and 
Utchi, the blocks’ colors are bright yellow, which means that 
almost all the malapps in these eight families are clustered into 
corresponding eight communities distinctly. E.g., 100% 
samples in Appquanta have been assigned to community X5, 
99. 65% samples in plankton are in community X1. However, a 
few mismatches exist. 25% samples in Smsspy and 21.3% 
samples in Youmi are both assigned to X12 community. We 
found that 42.4% features in Smsspy appear in Youmi. They 
are joint together since weights between these samples are 
above the threshold. 
To get an intuitional observation of the potential relations 
between families, we calculate the weights for each family pair. 
As shown in Fig. 9, the circles represent the weights among 
families. If two families have similar behaviors as well as high 
weight, the circle will be big and bright. We find that the high 
score may appear between families that don’t have similar 
descriptions. E.g., Smsspy is known as a banking Trojan family 
and Youmi is an adware family. From the descriptions, they 
seem to be unlike. However, as previously discussed, they have 
lots of common features and part of Smsspy and Youmi are 
divided into the same community. They share a weight of 3.8 
while the weight between Smsspy and another family, 
Appquanta, is only 1.4.  
 
 
Fig. 6. The relation graph of malapps 
 
 
Fig. 7. Communities of malapps 
 
Fig. 8. Community detection results of different families 
  
Fig. 9. Similarities between malapp families 
D. Discussion 
We build a relation graph and utilize a community detection 
method to extract relations among malapps, which achieves 
better results than traditional clustering methods and reduces 
the time consumption in the same time. Community detection 
methods have been widely used in social network. We notice 
that the relations between people and communities are much 
alike the relations between malapps and families. Therefore, we 
test the community detection method on malapp samples and 
the results prove it. In comparison, traditional clustering 
methods like k-means fail to cluster families of the multiple 
samples. 
The advantage of graph construction and community 
detection methods over traditional clustering methods, e.g., 
k-means, mainly lies in the ability to explore the implicit 
similarities of interrelated data. Clustering methods regard 
vertices as independent. But from the perspective of graph, the 
vertices are interrelated. By building a relation graph, we can 
describe the similarities between vertices by common feature 
sets directly and also by common nearest neighbors implicitly. 
When two malapps have no common features, traditional 
clustering methods would take them as different. But 
community detection methods can still capture the similarities 
between them through the edges of their neighbors. On the 
other hand, the features we observe may not be complete and 
precise. Community detection methods have better adaptability 
to noise and outliers because of the additional similarity 
information provided by the graph edges. 
Though we utilize community detection to find malapp 
families, there exists some differences. Both communities and 
families are clusters of malapps that have similar behaviors. 
Specifically, malapp families are classified with manual 
analyses and interventions. However, some similarities 
between malapps are not directly provided, but hidden in the 
edges in the relation graph. The community detection is an 
unsupervised as well as autonomous process. It can 
automatically discover the relations without manual work. 
Given malapp samples, communities can be obtained 
initiatively without any prior knowledge. 
E. Limitation  
The limitation is that our community detection based method 
for malapp family classification is not as precise as supervised 
learning approaches. However, it doesn’t rely on signatures or 
any prior learned patterns, and is able to detect novel malapps. 
It gives explainable results of the distribution of communities. 
Moreover, it shows better ability to cope with the situations of 
sample shortage and abundant unlabeled malapp samples. 
Faced with unknown malapps, it can automatically identify the 
quantity of families which is hard to determine for many other 
methods.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In response to the current trend of rapidly increasing number 
of malapp variants on Android-based MCPS, we propose a 
malapp community discovery framework to uncover the 
underlying relations among malapps. 11 categories of features 
are extracted to profile the behaviors of malapps in different 
aspects. Based on these behaviors, a relation graph is built to 
reveal the similarities among malapps. For the purpose of 
overcoming the disadvantages of epsilon graph and k-NN 
graph, we propose the E-N method in the relation graph 
construction step. The experimental results demonstrate its 
effectiveness and efficiency. We employ community detection 
technique to discover underlying relations of malapps in the 
relation graph. It has better ability to explore implicit 
similarities of interrelated data, compared with traditional 
clustering method. The experimental results verify the 
superiority of our method. It achieves the best performance 
with rand static of 94.93% and accuracy of 79.53%. 
In the future, we plan to explore more effective graph 
construction algorithms to better profile relations among 
malapps on Android-based MCPS. More features to 
characterize malapps’ behaviors are also being investigated. 
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